Beyond the Biological Weapons Convention: Rethinking international biosecurity governance in the age of synthetic biology

Abstract

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) remains the central international framework prohibiting biological weapons, but rapid advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, artificial intelligence-enabled protein design, and the wider diffusion of biotechnology are creating governance challenges that were not anticipated when the Convention was established. This paper examines whether the existing international biosecurity governance architecture is capable of addressing these emerging risks and identifies the institutional gaps that limit its effectiveness. Drawing on regime complex theory and the literature on institutional adaptation, the study uses a qualitative analysis of international rules, institutions, and governance arrangements involving states, international organizations, scientific communities, biotechnology firms, and other non-state actors. It argues that the BWC’s absence of a verification mechanism, limited implementation capacity, and predominantly state-centric structure constrain its ability to address a rapidly changing and increasingly decentralized biosecurity environment. The analysis finds that governance has expanded through overlapping and largely voluntary arrangements rather than through comprehensive reform of the BWC. While these arrangements provide important regulatory and normative functions, their fragmented nature creates gaps in coordination, accountability, and risk management. The study therefore argues that effective biosecurity governance requires a layered and adaptive architecture that preserves the BWC’s central normative role while strengthening its institutional capacity. It recommends minimum international standards for DNA-synthesis screening, greater formal integration of scientific and industry governance, and stronger coordination between the BWC framework and global health security institutions.